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Drawing on research from digital media studies, political theory and rhetoric this article 
explores online radical conservative and reactionary ‘ideological entrepreneurs’. It argues that 
online media are uniting an ‘ideological family’ around concepts of natural inequality and 
hostility to those who deny them. Placing this phenomenon in context the article shows how 
online culture reinvigorates well-established discourses of opposition to bureaucrats, 
intellectuals and experts of all kinds, rejecting one version of the neoliberal state and of its 
personnel, a ‘new class’ understood to dominate through discursive, cultural, power and 
imagined through the figures of the ‘Social Justice Warrior’ and the ‘Cultural Marxist’. In 
competing for a share of the marketplace of ideas these ideological entrepreneurs promise 
insights – the revelations of the ‘red pill’ - critiquing ‘actually-existing’ neoliberalism yet 
insisting on the ‘rationality’ of governance through markets and promising adherents 
techniques for achieving success as liberated entrepreneurial selves. 
 
Introduction 
In The New Way of the World Dardot and Laval explain the rise of neo-liberalism, partly with 
reference to ‘ideological entrepreneurs’, the writers, academics and intellectuals who used their 
position, particularly their media platform, to ‘struggle head-on against all forms of 
progressivism and social reform’ (2013: 132-3). Today ‘ideological entrepreneurship’ has been 
profoundly affected by the spread of digital, participatory and shareable forms of media. 
 
1 This article was written as part of the research project ‘Political Ideology, Rhetoric and Aesthetics in the 
Twenty-First Century: The Case of the 'Alt-Right': funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
(AH/R001197/1). I am grateful to the council for funding and to my colleagues on the project Dr. Cassian 
Osborne-Carey and Dr. Robert Topinka. 
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Barriers to entry into the ‘marketplace of ideas’ have lifted. Subscription and peer-to-peer 
payment systems enable those lacking institutionalised political or journalistic platforms to 
earn a living as a grassroots political ‘digital evangelist’ (Schradie, 2019). The most successful 
within this new ‘marketplace of ideas’ are ideological entrepreneurs disseminating (and 
reshaping) ‘populist’ political ideologies hostile to ‘globalism’, multiculturalism, the cultural 
and economic integration of minorities, feminism and gender politics. 
This article brings together and applies approaches from digital media studies, political theory 
and rhetoric in order to understand this phenomenon better. In the first section I review extant 
research into ‘radical conservative’ (Dahl, 1999) and ‘reactionary’ (Robin, 2018) politics 
online, considering a range of examples from the extremes of white nationalism to more 
mainstream opinion about the failures of liberal politics. In a second section, drawing on the 
political theory of political ideologies, I argue that online media erode distinctions between 
these kinds of politics which converge around hostility to a particular conceptualisation of 
‘Liberalism’ which is understood as the constitutive inability to recognise natural limits to 
equality and to social justice. In the third section I show that central to the articulation of this 
hostility is a concept of the ‘new class’ which I place within a longstanding political and critical 
literature. In a fourth section I discuss common online rhetorical tropes which organise and 
articulate this hostility today: the ‘Social Justice Warrior’, ‘Cultural Marxist’ and ‘red pill’. In 
the fifth and final section I argue that this critique of ‘actually-existing’ neoliberalism 
nevertheless insists on the ‘rationality’ of neoliberal governance through markets. It 
interpellates adherents as entrepreneurial selves, holding their valuable attention by promising 
them techniques for fully inhabiting a neoliberal ‘system of norms and functions’ (Dardot and 
Laval, 2013: 13). 
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Overall, the article aims to make a number of contributions. It synthesises findings from a large 
and diverse literature, presents an overview and explanation of a wide range of online political 
ideas and arguments, and develops an original interpretation of the relationship between 
neoliberalism and reactionary politics online. 
Right Online 
 
The volume of online communication, the speed of turnover and the difficulties of interpreting 
political ideas communicated in various combinations and styles of words and images, makes 
for a bewildering, overgrown, ecology. Creating a comprehensive taxonomy of species is no 
easy task when the analyst of conservative, right and far-right politics is confronted by such a 
range of potential categories as ‘nationalists, identitarians, libertarians, neoconservatives, 
paleoconservatives, counter-jihadists, and neoreactionaries’ (Sedgwick, 2019: xiii, xiv).  
Consequently, inductive, data-driven, studies of the political right online often identify 
‘communities’ rather than ideologies giving them names which have emerged from within this 
political subculture: the “Intellectual Dark Web”, the “Alt-lite” and the “Alt-right” (e.g. Ribeiro 
et. al. 2019). Lewis’ study of political connectivity on YouTube identified an ‘Alternative 
Influence Network’, ‘an interlocking series of videos, references, and guest appearances’ 
involving self-defined Conservatives, Libertarians and White Nationalists united in ‘general 
opposition to feminism, social justice, or left-wing politics’ and collaborating ‘to the point that 
ideological differences become impossible to take at face value’ (2018: 8). Building on Lewis, 
Munger and Philips (2019) propose a five-part classification: ‘liberals’ such as podcaster Joe 
Rogan who interviews celebrities alongside a range of political writers; ‘Sceptics’, 
unconvinced by ‘identity politics’ centred on gender or race; ‘Conservatives’, commentators 
who combine opposition to identity politics with pro-market traditionalism and also contribute 
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to ‘old’ media ; ‘alt-lite’ provocateurs; and those most committed to far-right racial politics - 
the ‘alt-right’. 
 
These descriptions of how things appear within digital media help organise a large field and 
distinguish some of its parts. But such analyses paint only a part of the picture and can be 
complemented by research drawing on the history and development of political ideas and 
ideologies. Here, studies find that White Nationalism is the ‘centre of gravity’ of the alt-right 
(Lyons, 2017; see also Hawley, 2017; Nagle, 2017; Neiwert, 2017). This includes ‘traditional’ 
forms of neo-Nazism (as found on anti-Semitic and conspiracist podcast and website The Right 
Stuff) and those presenting what Hawley calls a more ‘highbrow’ appearance. For example, 
through the original alternativeright.com which he founded, and latterly through the anti-
Semitic Radix Journal, Richard Spencer has attempted to develop in America the kind of 
cultural ‘metapolitics’ associated with the European New Right.2 
 
Less Europhilic expressions are found on sites with their roots in American paleoconservatism 
(Lyons, 2017; Nagle, 2017: 54-67; Hawley, 2017: 9-33; also Woltermann, 1993; Drolet and 
Williams, 2020). Here, economically as well as politically nationalist ideas blend with 
Christianity, defence of ‘traditional’ sex-roles and opposition to immigration. An example is 
the ethnonationalist website American Renaissance (formerly a print publication) founded by 
racial segregationist Jared Taylor (see Taylor, 2011; Nieli, 2019). The core of his argument is 
that racial differences are a feature of natural reality, ‘an important aspect of individual and 
group identity and the most important of all societal fault lines’. Taylor draws in particular on 
the thinking of Samuel T. Francis, the paleoconservative thinker fired from The Washington 
 
2 On Spencer see Bar-On (2019); for ‘metapolitics’ see Benoist and Champetier (2000) and for a critique  see 
Mondon (2015). European sources for the online right include the mystical Traditionalism of Evola (Sedgwick, 
2004), the Identitarian movement (Willinger, 2011) Russian Traditionalist Aleksander Dugin (2012; also Lyons, 
2017; Orellana and Michelsen, 2019). 
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Post for speaking (at an American Renaissance conference) against ‘the anti-white racialist 
movement’, the ‘fraudulent’ liberalism of Martin-Luther King and Mandela, and in favour of 
the political unity of the White race (Taylor, 1994; Francis, 2014). 
Where American Renaissance foregrounds the ‘White’ in ‘White Nationalism’ other anti-
immigration sites such as VDare foreground the Nationalism. Founded by former National 
Review columnist Peter Brimelow VDare claims an educational mission, asking ‘the national 
question’ and committed to informing ‘the fight to keep America American’. Here the core 
political propositions are that nation-states must be culturally unified, America’s is an identity 
‘unique to history’, and that  human differences - ‘philosophical, cultural or biological’ - are 
grounded in race and ethnicity. Diversity therefore weakens polities.3  
Both sites draw on claims about the heritability of traits and their incidence by race and gender, 
so-called ‘sex-realism’ and ‘race-realism’, sometimes ‘Human Bio Diversity’ (HBD) (Hawley, 
2017: 67-8) the name of an online discussion forum created by another former National Review 
journalist (and VDare contributor) Steve Sailer. Here, political arguments are presented as 
scientific truths which others are too weak or scared to articulate. HBD-focused twitter feed 
‘Uncensored Science’ describes itself as ‘Bringing you the latest in censored politically 
incorrect truth’ and the website http://humanbiologicaldiversity.com quotes Orwell on its 
masthead: ‘In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act’. VDare claims 
it embodies ‘a bold idea’ held to ‘in the face of unwavering hostility from the Main Stream 
Media’. 
Emphasis on race differences is not confined to conservatives and nationalists. Canadian 
libertarian ‘anarcho-capitalist’ YouTuber Stefan Molyneux promoted such ‘realism’ to nine-
 
3 See https://vdare.com/about 
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hundred thousand subscribers to his channel (hosting Brimelow and Taylor, self-help author 
Jordan Peterson, Noam Chomsky and a range of right-of-centre ideological entrepreneurs). He 
presents himself as a philosopher, blending Randian style ‘objectivism’ with Libertarian anti-
statism and intense belief in the significance and evolutionary basis of race and sex differences. 
The latter is prominent in the so-called ‘manosphere’ and the writings of, for example, far-
right, neopagan advocate of ‘male tribalism’ Jack Donovan (see Lyons, 2019) and anti-feminist 
conspiracy theorist Mike Cernovich. The last of these rose to online prominence in large part 
because of “Gamergate” in 2014, the semi-organised, voluble and aggressive online 
contestation of the role of women in the computer gaming industry. This bewilderingly 
significant phenomenon catalysed the crystallisation of a variety of hitherto inchoate online 
political trends, demonstrating the commercial viability of a new kind of ideological 
entrepreneurship and the capacity of contributions to discussion forums and ‘chans’ to 
crossover onto mainstream platforms such as YouTube, Twitter and Reddit, reshaping public 
discourse about gender politics and feminism (Nagel, 2017: 19-24; Burgess & Matamoros-
Fernández, 2016; Massanari, 2017; Salter, 2018). Through Gamergate themes from ‘sex-
realism’ were circulated across platforms giving them a wider audience (bringing with them 
themes from ‘race-realism’, Paleoconservatism and Nationalism). 
Elsewhere, ideological entrepreneurs have appealed to tech entrepreneurs in the form of the 
‘neoreactionary’ movement or ‘Dark Enlightenment’, a baroque, techno-futurist, political 
philosophy (Burrows, 2018; Tait, 2019). Here belief in natural hierarchy is not restricted to the 
categories of race and gender but part of an argument for empowering the few capable of 
resisting the dominance of liberal humanism, figuratively represented as ‘the cathedral’ of 
academia, politics and journalism. Neoreaction advocates the dissolution of these monasteries 
so that a new elite can accelerate technological innovation and institute the order of artificial 
intelligences which it sees as our destiny and salvation. 
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A different strand of online political ideology – the so-called ‘alt-lite’ – is distinguishable by 
its style of ‘irreverent assault on political correctness’ (Hawley, 2017: 141). Polemical, vulgar 
and ironic it wages provocative discursive and aesthetic warfare on liberalism, exulting in the 
reaction. For example, the UK-based Paul Joseph Watson tells 1.8m subscribers to his 
YouTube channel that Liberalism is a ‘mental disorder’ (Watson, 2015b) and Feminists ‘fat 
and ugly’ (Watson, 2015a). Such ‘bad manners’ exemplify the ‘populist style’ identified by 
Moffit (2016). Disseminated through online posting boards and chans with a common verbal 
and visual vocabulary this style shapes subcultural identities through which individuals learn 
about political ideas and promote them by creating and sharing jokes, memes and ‘shitposts’ 
(Topinka, 2018; Fielitz and Thurston, 2019). Such gestural ‘transgression’ and demonstrative 
non-conformity is characteristic of online subcultures across the internet (Philips, 2016). Nagel 
is correct that this is a response to ‘callout culture’ (2017: 68-85) but it is a political response 
intended to unsettle, uproot and expose liberal consensus as mere convention. That is a well-
established rhetorical tactic (Chambers and Finlayson, 2008). An indicative example is 
mockery of ‘the argument from the current year’. Declarations such as ‘It’s 2021! How can 
you say that?’, in response to expressions contrary to liberal social values, imply belief in the 
inevitable and harmonious flow of progress. Shitposters provoke so as to ‘reveal’ that 
Liberalism rests on this unacknowledged metaphysical conviction about the necessary destiny 
of humanity, represented as a quasi-religious faith recited by, in internet slang, ‘NPCs’, people 
like the Non-Playable Characters in video games who can say and do only what they are 
programmed to. 
A different sort of self-conscious and self-declared transgression characterises the so-called 
‘Intellectual Dark Web’ or ‘IDW’ (Weiss, 2018) a label used by supporters to refer to a range 
of political writers including psychologist Jordan Peterson and Douglas Murray associate 
editor at The Spectator. Articulating a (familiar) critique of ‘tenured radicals’ they are 
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described as ‘iconoclastic’, ‘academic renegades’ with views ‘that sound unlike anything else 
happening, at least publicly, in the culture right now’ (Weiss, 2018). The academy is identified 
with conformist liberalism, accused of putting ideology above science, distanced from the 
culture and values of the nation, corrupted by its embrace of the principle of campus diversity 
yet too cowardly to stand up to students’ identity politics and complaints of microaggression. 
These writers speak from traditional, pre-digital, bases of authority (commercial media and 
university professorships) but have found significant audiences and countercultural cache 
through podcasts, YouTube and other social media (especially The Rubin Report, The Daily 
Wire and the Rogan podcast). Their public lectures and TV appearances are widely 
recirculated, reedited and commented on, forming supplementary content produced by 
ideological entrepreneurs with smaller markets. 
We find, then, a range of ‘ideological entrepreneurs’ opposed to ‘progressivism and social 
reform’. Digital communication has increased their reach and potential prominence, creating a 
‘marketplace of ideas’ within which an increasing range of conservative and reactionary 
ideologies may compete for a share of success. For these, inequality is a core concept, 
understood as a natural phenomenon, scientifically verified and the necessary basis of civil 
order, essential to the maintenance of individual freedom, economic stability and cultural 
coherence; Liberalism’s failure to recognise the reality of inequality is leading to civilisational 
decline and illegitimate domination, and must be exposed as ungrounded, irrational and against 
nature. These entrepreneurs differ in style and content, drawing on different parts of the 
reactionary ideological tradition. However, as we shall see, their internal coherence and their 
relations with each other are fundamentally changed by the online platforms that now bring 
them to market. 
Ideologies Online 
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Political ideologies (the ‘isms organising politics) may be understood, following Freeden 
(1998), as distinct combinations of political concepts through which the contested ideas of 
politics are temporarily ‘decontested’ and shared politics made possible. Certain concepts are 
fixed as ‘core’, anchoring the whole, with other ‘adjacent’ concepts, supplementing or 
modifying that core while those at the ‘periphery’ are linked to applications of the ideology 
and responses to events. Over time, in response to social change, political events, ideological 
contestation and innovation, concepts change their places. Some increase in importance, others 
fade from significance. Theoretical and historical analysis of political ideologies is concerned 
with identifying, mapping and explaining that process.  
Political ideologies are not fixed categories but fields of relatively contained contestation. 
Digital communication dramatically changes how such contestation happens, disrupting the 
boundaries of ideological intellectual traditions making them parts of broader, looser ‘fields’,  
fluid ‘ideological families’ (Freeden, 2013: 127-8). Three things are most important here. 
Firstly, as we have seen, digital media increase the volume of participants in ideological 
production and circulation. This flooding of the marketplace of ideas also changes its shape. 
Constituencies ‘constrained by the scope of the ideology of extant media’ may now ‘switch 
into consuming media more consistent with their ideal points’ (Munger and Philips, 2019: 12). 
That facilitates (or forces) new kinds of consolidation and differentiation of political positions 
in ways driven by that market as well as by conceptual logics internal to ideological traditions. 
Secondly, digital media further erode the authority and effectiveness of traditional gatekeepers 
of ideological purity. The covers of a book, copyright claims of an author and rules of political 
party meetings set clear, albeit porous, boundaries to constellations of political ideas and policy 
proposals, giving them identifiable origins and specifiable destinations while policing their 
limits. Ideological traditions and their canons have not survived the onslaught of fluid media 
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which disorganise such lineages, overflowing the boundaries of national political cultures, 
increasing the range of resources from which political ideas and arguments are made. The 
inherently intertextual nature of online communication, the speed of its decontextualization 
and recontextualization, the ease with which consumers move between sources and resources, 
unsettles classifications of political genre. Memes, ‘spreadable’ media (Mihailidis and Viotty, 
2017) move ideas, themes, the argot and discursive style of trolling subculture from the ‘fringe’ 
into the ‘mainstream’ in a way which blurs that very distinction (Phillips, 2016). Key sites or 
individuals are condensation points for an eclectic range of ideas while phrases and slogans, 
fragments of propositions broken free of the arguments within which they first appeared, flow 
across forms and forums, picked up by individuals plotting their own path through them. For 
example, Lewis shows how Jordan Peterson, a mainstream figure from the “Intellectual Dark 
Web”, is connected with fringe participants like Richard Spencer through the appearances each 
made, discussing IQ, on the YouTube channel run by ‘Sargon of Akkad’, a Swindon-based 
UKIP member (Lewis, 2018: 9). Peterson and Spencer are not politically indistinguishable but 
the medium brings them into the same discursive universe from the perspective of viewers, 
literally putting them on the same page of algorithmically generated viewing 
recommendations; fragments of claims about psychology, nature and genetics flow online 
between and around them. In such ideological assemblages ‘diverse elements infiltrate into the 
others, metabolizing into a moving complex’ (Connolly, 2005: 870). 
Thirdly, and because of this, style and rhetorical form assume heightened significance for 
politics online. They define and distinguish political-ideological positions. Internal coherence 
established at the level of persuasive form as much as propositional content. Freeden argues 
that ideologies are a ‘sampling’ of the ‘variety of human thinking on politics, contained within 
and presented through a communicative and action-inspiring pattern’ (1998: 54). For viewers 
and readers sent from tweet to article to video to posting board and back again (by whim, 
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platforms’ recommendation algorithms or other users’ sharing practices) the nuances of 
ideological logics are less significant than that ‘pattern’, in the form of a shared style or 
‘aesthetic’. 
In the cauldrons of the internet, the heat of emotions, reactions and disputations, the speed of 
experimentation, testing and adaptation, force ideas to cohere in new ways. What might have 
seemed historically, culturally and rationally distinct is bound by the force and fire of 
algorithmic, affective and aesthetic congruence. The arrangement of concepts comprising 
White Nationalist and mainstream conservative politics is different, even contradictory 
(Hawley, 2017: 91-114) but alt-right rhetoric builds stylistic bridges between them (Hartzell, 
2018). Contradictory and conflicting positions have converged around ‘radical conservatism’ 
(Dahl, 1999) united by dramatic performances and expressions of hostility to ‘liberalism’. At 
one end is the ‘alt-right’ critique of what paleoconservative intellectual Samuel T. Francis 
called ‘the universalist world-view’ for which ‘there is neither history nor race nor even 
species, neither specific cultures nor particular peoples nor meaningful boundaries’ and which, 
he says, ‘has assumed several different names: Marxism, liberalism, globalism, 
egalitarianism…’ (2012: 48). At another end is Douglas Murray’s charges against ‘liberal 
dogmatism’  and ‘metaphysics’ which he associates with the continued influence of Marxists 
(Murray, 2019: 467-8; 104-123). In between are all kinds of ‘alt-lite’ mockery of ‘woke’ 
culture. Though placing different emphases on concepts such as tradition, order and religion, 
all advance arguments about natural and scientifically identifiable inequalities which put them 
in a polemical relationship with a Liberalism they understand to be based on denial of nature, 
at variance with reality, hostile to science and successful only because forcefully imposed by 
institutions of education, and systems of communication controlled by cynical and elitist 
‘universal’ intellectuals, ready to deploy the weapons of censure and censorship. From far-right 
racist ideologies to mainstream conservatism that analysis is articulated and performed as an 
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unpalatable truth revealed by brave, honest, subversive, thinkers unafraid to challenge 
established power. We turn next to how that power is conceptualised, its errors and corrupting 
influence named and ‘revealed’. 
The ‘New Class’ 
 
The idea of the ‘new class’ has a long and varied history (Barbrook, 2006). Understanding and 
explaining the significance of white-collar managerial, knowledge and cultural workers has 
been such a preoccupation of post-war social science that, as one observed, ‘an entire history 
of political sociology could be written on the theme of the "new middle classes”’ (Ross, 1978: 
163). That ‘new class’ has been thought definitive of post-industrial knowledge societies (e.g. 
Bell, 1973), identified as a secular and technical intelligentsia inevitably conflicting with 
existing traditions and authorities (Gouldner, 1979), considered a new source of anti-capitalist 
resistance (Touraine, 1971) and as central to new modes of workplace domination, control and 
surveillance (Carchedi, 1987). More recently it has been given various names (and invested 
with various hopes) in mainstream political discourse. In nineteen-nineties ‘third way’ political 
economy, future growth and development were believed to require development of a global, 
knowledge and information economy within which skilled and adaptable individuals could 
flourish through expressing their creativity and employing their cognitive capacity. Across 
Europe social democrats came to think that knowledge was a form of capital owned by the 
worker and that intensifying it was therefore egalitarian and liberatory (Andersson, 2010). It 
followed that social justice could best be achieved not by limiting the domination of the labour 
market but by equipping individuals with the social, cultural and other capitals needed to 
compete fully within it. Discrimination (on the basis of race, gender, disability) was a breach 
of rights but also, because it limited the movement of knowledge-capital, economically 
damaging. The future depended on supporting and empowering ‘the Symbolic Analysts, the 
 13 
Virtual Class, the Digerati, the Digital Citizen, the Swarm Capitalists, the New Barbarians, the 
Bobos, the Netocracy and the Creative Class’ (Barbrook 2006: 23). 
 
If such figurations of the ‘new class’ have been central to technocratic Liberalism they have 
been just as important for its opponents. In the twentieth-century, left-wing critics of 
Communism developed a critique of bureaucratic ‘state capitalism’ which has become central 
to twenty-first century conservatism. For example, the American James Burnham, having 
identified the new class with industrial managers, went on to  abandon Trotskyism in favour of 
Conservatism, helping to found The National Review. His 1964 The Suicide of the West, 
influential across the Conservative spectrum, especially for Paleoconservatives, rhetorically 
redescribes Liberalism as the ideology of ‘opinion-makers, molders and transmitters’, 
university and school teachers, journalists, people in the arts and ‘verbalists in all branches of 
government’ (1964: 32). Because they believe that nothing in mutable human nature hinders 
the establishment of peace, freedom, justice and wellbeing (1964: 50) Liberals, Burnham 
argues, conceive of social problems as outcomes of ignorance and badly designed institutions. 
Consequently, politics becomes ‘education generalised’ (1964: 72) and Liberalism, elevating 
justice over freedom, increases state power over individuals while failing to defend the nation 
from enemies without and criminals within. It is blinded to reality by its egalitarianism, the 
‘quantitative reduction of human beings to Common Man’ and rejection of ‘qualitative 
distinctions’ (1964: 288). 
 
For later writers such as Irving Kristol, also once committed to Trotskyism (Kristol, 1977), the 
new class consisted of a very wide range of occupations: ‘scientists, teachers and educational 
administrators, journalists and others in the communications industries’ and ‘psychologists, 
social workers, those lawyers and doctors who make their careers in the expanding public 
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sector, city planners, the staffs of large foundations, the upper level of the government 
bureaucracy’ (Kristol, 1978: 27) -  a wide range of roles, aligned and linked with the welfare 
state, and targets for neoliberal critiques of state inefficiency. Paul Gottfried, an academic, 
former student of Marcuse (and mentor to Richard Spencer) has effectively updated Burnham 
by drawing on Hayek, von Mises and Ruggiero (1999: 9-11) although here, instead of suicide 
Liberals have committed ‘patricide’ (1999: xi) abandoning their nineteenth-century progenitors 
for social planning in the name of ‘humanitarian and “scientific” goals’ achieved through 
managerial and judicial intervention (1999: 5). Welfare ‘entitlements’ are symptoms of the new 
class capture of the state, creating permanent clients to keep it in power, supplanting 
Republican ideals of simplicity and frugality with self-indulgence and luxury, turning 
aristocratic vices into virtues (1999: 34-5). Socialism has been replaced by ‘a more enduring 
form of collectivism’ and administration converted into ‘an instrument of equity’ (1999: 55); 
ideals of pluralism and cultural inclusion disguise ‘behavioural coercion’ of those who ‘think 
differently’ (1999: 88). Of particular harm, says Gottfried, are the ‘antisocial postmodernist 
values of New Class verbalists’ (1999: 72) who have subverted education by turning it into a 
means for shaping ‘social personality’. That position is echoed online by Jordan Peterson when 
he claims that ‘Departments like Women’s Studies have trained between three-hundred 
thousand and three-million radical left-wing activists’4 and that ‘…the postmodernist types 
have infiltrated bureaucratic organizations at the mid to upper level and that's actually what 
they're trained to do by their activist professors in university’.5  
 
The political potential of a movement defined by opposition to this new class has been 
identified by a variety of observers. For example, Paul Piccone, founder and editor for thirty 
 
4 See The Agenda with Steve Palkin’, ‘Genders, Rights and Freedom of Speech’, YouTube, (starting at 31.00), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kasiov0ytEc 
5 See, The Epoch Times, ‘Jordan Peterson Exposes the Postmodernist Agenda’, (part 1 of 7) 3rd July 2017, 
starting at 5.30 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkNzYttjSHE) 
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years of the journal Telos, long argued that the left/right division obscured struggles ‘not 
between capital and labour, but between those with cultural and political capital and those 
without’ (quoted in Raventos, 2002: 138; also Lowndes, 2017). He used the journal to develop 
the influential argument that new-class cultural power is the fundamental source of domination 
in consumer capitalist democracies, publishing Marxian critiques alongside those of 
Paleoconservatives and the European New Right, proposing that populist opposition to it is the 
centre of radical resistance today. In the UK former members of the Revolutionary Communist 
Party, grouped around online magazine Spiked, have implemented such a strategy becoming 
influential within the British Conservative government (Beckett, 2020). In America 
Conservative Libertarian Murray Rothbard advocated a strategy of ‘Right-Wing Populism’ 
shaped by antagonism to ‘politicians and bureaucrats allied with…powerful corporate and Old 
Money financial elites… Ivy League academics and media elites, who constitute the opinion-
moulding class in society’ (Rothbard, 1992). For F. H. Buckley, Law professor, senior editor 
at the American Spectator and speechwriter for Trump, his candidate stood opposed to the ‘new 
class’ (2016) and won because people wanted to destroy the administrative state it had created,  
bringing down the aristocracy of ‘well-credentialed’ elites ‘atop the greasy pole’ (2018). Steve 
Bannon, speaking at CPAC in 2017 while still working for the Trump administration, stated 
that the three goals of the Presidency would be national security, economic nationalism and 
‘deconstruction of the administrative state’. 
 
A range of ideological currents – conservatism, nationalism, ethnonationalism, libertarianism  
- share a critique of the liberal state which gives to it a cultural and intellectual rather than 
economic class character. That critique emphasises the linguistic and discursive power of ‘new 
class’ intellectuals, exercised through institutions of culture, communication and legal 
regulation, oppressing or victimising those with contrary cultural, political and ethical 
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orientations. Today this analysis is the basis of a broad-based systematic challenge to the 
technocratic politics of third-way neoliberalism and globalisation. The new class is the 
common enemy, under a variety of names: ‘the establishment’, ‘the swamp’, ‘the blob’, ‘the 
cathedral’. Because followers can characterise members of these groups variously as 
bureaucrats, intellectuals, civil servants, climate scientists, gender theorists, feminists, public 
sector workers, journalists, screenwriters, specific ethnic groups and so on, this antagonism 
sustains an otherwise unlikely alliance of Trump supporters, online ‘Men Going Their Own 
Way’, Christian Identity militias, radical libertarians, ethnonationalists, anti-feminists, 
American paleoconservatives, ‘race realists’, anti-Muslims, anti-communists. Online and 
offline that equivalence is intensified through common rhetorical repertoires, shared reference 
points, forms and styles of argumentation which make up a distinct ‘community of discourse’ 
(Salazar, 2018), a counter-cultural rhetoric of enmity against the ‘verbalists’. 
 
Figures of Anti-Liberalism 
 
Critical sociological analysis of the new class sees it as an outcome of high-level features of 
modernity - secularisation, bureaucratisation, de-traditionalization – and also of specific 
changes to family structure and labour markets, the blurring of national-cultural boundaries, 
the extension of governmental pastoral power. But contemporary reactionary politics finds 
these things to be effects not causes, manifestations of the political predilections and interests 
of the new class. Similarly, claims to equality made on behalf of various groups, because they 
lack a basis in natural reality, must be mystifications of new class ideology. Thus ‘identity 
politics’ can be explained not with reference to histories of economic or juridical organisation 
but to strategic political intervention. Peterson, in a lecture criticising the concept of ‘white 
privilege’, says he ‘can't quite figure out why the postmodernists have made the canonical 
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distinctions they've made – race, ethnicity, sexual proclivity, sexual gender identity’. His 
answer is that ‘you privilege some of those dimensions over the other’ because ‘it sustains your 
bloody Marxist interpretation, that's why’. 
For any ideological formation ‘naming the enemy’, revealing its hand and enumerating its  
guises is important political work. In this case that work is focused on awakening people to the 
presence of the ‘new class’, the varied guises it may take, showing how we are dominated by 
it and dispelling its mythology. Online culture has generated a variety of new figures and tropes 
for achieving this goal. In the past the new class has been metaphorised as the ‘bureaucrat’, 
‘civil servant’, ‘academic’ and ‘journalist’. Anonymous posting boards such as 4chan - in its 
day an incredibly influential part of a ‘deep vernacular web’ (Zeeuw and Tuters, 2020), a source 
of ‘memetic antagonism’ (Tuters and Hagen, 2020) and of munitions for semiotic warfare 
against rules of all kinds (Hine et. al. 2017; Tuters et al.: 2018) – have helped create and 
propagate other mythical, metaphorical, ‘archetypes’ such as the ‘Social Justice Warrior’ 
(Massanari & Chess, 2018). Amplified through Gamergate, the mytheme of the ‘SJW’  
connotes a ‘monstrous feminine’ figure (Massanari & Chess, 2018), a student, a millennial, a 
young woman aggressively sanctioning others, irrational yet powerful, superficially motivated 
by political commitment but in truth by a desire for social approval and advance in the corrupt 
world of the new class. That class is figured as the ‘Cultural Marxist’. This label for a range of 
perspectives in social and political theory predates the internet. Its origins lie in 
Paleoconservative writing from where it has developed into a conspiracy theory holding that 
acolytes of the Frankfurt School are enacting a plan to undermine America by promoting 
feminism and anti-racism (Jamin, 2014). Online the idea has taken on new life (Richardson, 
2015; Manavis, 2019) becoming shorthand for the argument that claims to racial or gender 
equality are a spurious invention of those with a sinister hidden ‘agenda’ (Peterson, 2017; 
Murray, 2019). The Cultural Marxist is a jargonising guru mesmerising impressionable 
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students, exploiting them financially while covertly and calculatedly destroying Western 
culture by encouraging immigration. The idea has been taken up by Members of Parliament 
and circulated in magazines such as The Spectator (Walker, 2019). Along with the ‘SJW’ the 
figure is central to a political rhetoric which has emerged from the fusion of offline and online 
reactionary spaces, the inhabitants of which see themselves as involved in a war for hearts and 
minds, teaching others to see the invisible left-hand behind events, and to learn how to protect 
themselves by becoming part of the cultural, intellectual and moral resistance. Jordan Peterson, 
for instance, advises school students to leave their classes if teachers begin discussing diversity, 
inclusivity or equity, to video it and post it to YouTube.6 Such awareness and resistance is most 
powerfully conveyed through the rhetoric of ‘the red pill’. 
In a 1976 interview French New Right theorist Alain de Benoist advocated an ‘awakening’, a 
metaphysical, metapolitical, cultural struggle against the ideology of egalitarianism which 
convinces people by appealing to universal reason. Its opponents had to speak to ‘the heart and 
soul’ using ‘images rather than concepts’ in order to ‘bring to the surface a sensibility which 
has been repressed in the unconscious of our peoples by two-thousand years of egalitarianism’ 
(quoted in Taguieff, 1993: 111). Such an affective politics of the image, structured by the trope 
of awakening, and of ‘revelation’ is captured by the ‘red pill’, a reference to the film The Matrix 
in which the hero is invited to take a red pill which will enable him to see beyond illusion, the 
reality that humanity is trapped in a computer simulation (Ging, 2017; Aikin, 2019). Online 
‘taking the red pill’ or being ‘red pilled’ names an experience of political-cultural awakening, 
the revelation that the new class (in media, government and education) is propagating 
falsehoods in which they do not themselves believe: the universality of humanity, natural 
equality, progress. Shared stories of taking the red pill are conversion narratives about the 
 
6 Peterson, 2018 ‘To Junior High, High School Students and their Parents’, Jan 2nd 2018 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0EuQe6BOWo  
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struggle to open the mind, of finding the courage to go beyond the boundaries of conventional 
thought and discourse, accepting that the natural facts of inequality are the basis for true 
political reasoning. As Lewis notes these narratives often manifest as personal ‘ideological 
testimonials’ a common form of online ‘influencer’ marketing (2018: 25-28).  
 
Red-pilling, then, is a familiar trope about political consciousness, here connected with 
powerful tropes of secrecy and revelation. YouTuber Paul Joseph Watson is typical in regularly 
titling videos ‘The Truth About…’ and ‘What they're NOT telling you’ (Finlayson 2020) as is 
men’s rights podcaster Mike Cernovich when he documents ‘fake news’ in his book Hoaxed: 
Everything They Told You is a Lie. These themes have a lineage in liberal conceptions of 
publicity and transparency where they are a means for the regulation of government. But stories 
of the red pill, rather than emphasise transparency, scrutiny and deliberation focus on the 
subject of revelation who learns to recognise the hidden meaning of words and how to give 
things their true name. The red pill inoculates individuals from infection by Liberalism. It’s 
taking is part of a hero’s journey across the gap separating conventional thinking from ideas 
which, because they are ‘edgy’, beyond the boundaries, are proof of the free, independent, 
spirit articulating them. Thus the red pill trope sanctions unconventional, profane speech, 
objections to which are to be expected from the NPCs, and proof of true insight. Tactics of 
demonstrative disruption and rejection of norms follow: calls to boycott classes, ‘politically 
incorrect’ discourse, performed rejections of the precepts of egalitarianism, circulating 
unreadable or seemingly meaningless memes and copypasta (Topinka, 2021). The space of 
digital media is, then, a theatre of ‘culture war’, a proving ground for those demonstrating their 





The unifying ‘essence’ of contemporary radical conservatism (online and offline) is hostility 
to ‘the new class’ and to its works: cultural and economic globalisation, the erosion of national 
cultures, gender equality, racial diversity, the deregulation of labour markets and other goals 
of ‘knowledge economy’ social democrats, third-way progressives, New Democrats. In this 
respect we might see such reactionary politics as a formation largely opposed to neoliberalism. 
However, hostility to technocrats is also part of a Hayekian objection to the extension of state 
power in the name of social justice (Hawley, 2017: 34-35; Slobodian, 2018). That connection 
in theory is affirmed in style. 
 
Neoliberalism is not only a political and economic philosophy. It is also a means of governing 
through practices of the self, shaped by an ideal of the ‘entrepreneurial subject’ (Foucault, 
2008; Rose, 2000) immersed in competition, seeking always to ‘maximize his results by 
exposing himself to risks and taking full responsibility for possible failures’ (Dardot and Laval, 
2013). That subject - imbued with the ‘new spirit’ of capitalism -  is an expression of what 
McNay describes as the ‘wide-ranging application of the idea of human capital to decipher all 
kinds of social relations, from education, genetics, social mobility and migration to the most 
intimate of interactions’ (2009: 59) interpellating us, as Wendy Brown argues, as 
‘entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life’ (Brown 2005: 42). To take the red pill is to 
accept such an interpellation without reservation; to see that behind the mystifications of the 
SJW’s and Cultural Marxists, reality is a power struggle between unequals. Thus, on the men’s 
rights Red Pill forum on Reddit, the central revelation is that sexual and marriage relations, 
which men are said to be naturally inclined to think of ‘idealistically’, are really domains of 
economic and genetic competition: women seek to exploit their partners, financially and 
biologically, marrying and living off the compliant, hard-working ‘beta’ male while seeking 
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evolutionarily better impregnation by the dominant, aggressive ‘alpha’ (Dignam and 
Rohlinger, 2019). Feminism is thus construed as a kind of anti-competitive behaviour, 
disrupting sexual and marriage markets through collective action (Ging, 2017). As one poster 
to Reddit explained: ‘Feminism is a sexual strategy. It puts women into the best position they 
can find, to select mates, to determine when they want to switch mates, to locate the best DNA 
possible, and to garner the most resources they can individually achieve’ (quoted in 
Valkenburgh, 2018: 6). The appeal of the red pill is that it frees those who take it from the 
false-consciousness of egalitarianism, enabling them to improve their strategic action in market 
situations. Participants in men’s rights forums seek education in how to project ‘alpha-male’ 
qualities, using ‘pick-up’ techniques to become profitable entrepreneurs of the sexual 
marketplace. Valkenburgh, highlights Red Pill forum members’ interest in rational-actor 
theories, their application of authors such as Becker and Baumeister to sexual relationships as 
a praxeology, increasing ‘Sexual Market Value’ (2018: 14-15).  
 
This orientation is reaffirmed – and naturalised – by the competitive and acquisitive format of 
online communication platforms and by online cultures of ‘debate’. In its theory of human 
action Neoliberalism ‘prioritizes an agonistic dimension: competition and rivalry’ (Dardot and 
Laval, 2013: 103). For Schumpeter the entrepreneurial motivation wasn’t merely hedonistic or 
dynastic but marked by a ‘will to conquer’, to ‘prove oneself superior to others’. Economic 
action was ‘akin to sport’, featuring ‘financial races, or rather boxing-matches’ in which 
financial outcome is secondary to the display of one’s victory. In online political culture such 
competition is celebrated and has economic value. The heroic individual, freed from 
convention, can enact opposition to the SJW’s and Cultural Marxists, in a competition through 
which he proves himself. Structured as reward-based systems for the creation and distribution 
of communicative content, social media platforms, where value and success are measured in 
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upvotes, karma and subscribers, induce and naturalise behaviours oriented to the achievement 
and celebration of remunerative success in the ‘marketplace of ideas’. Free speech and debate 
are understood not primarily as means for verifying constative utterances but as domains for 
the demonstration of transgressive discursive skill. Thus, for example, the phenomena of 
‘internet bloodsports’, ‘no-holds barred’ debate about ‘prohibited’ topics, of video 
compilations of clips titled ‘X destroys SJW’ ‘X’s savage comebacks’, posted as proof of 
success in virtuous combat. Similarly, discourses of ‘resilience’ often associated with 
neoliberal modes of governmentality are reworked and repurposed within forums filled with 
advice on fitness, gym culture, the use of nootropics as well as reading lists and other guides 
on self-development. One has to learn to protect oneself from the intrusions and depredations 
of liberal modernity, to see when one is being fooled and live outside of society. YouTuber 
Paul Joseph Watson writes that ‘The battle begins at home’, against feelings of depression and 
self-loathing, and one must learn self-respect so as to be able to escape false reality. 
Cernovich’s Gorilla Mindset, subtitled ‘how to control your thoughts and emotions to live life 
on your own terms’, offers techniques to help readers become confident, maintain focus, be 
physically fit and financially secure by branding themselves (what he calls ‘You Inc.’). 
 
For all that it appears as a restorationist critique of third-way neoliberalism, this contemporary 
configuration of reactionary politics is very much in tune - affectively and aesthetically – with 
the rhythms and styles of what Byun-Hul Chan calls the ‘achievement society’. It celebrates 
heroic individualism, expressed as manly and victorious conduct in marketplaces of all kinds. 
It does not question the commodification of the self but reveals selves to have been priced 
incorrectly, the market rigged by SJWs, Cultural Marxists and administrative-state bureaucrats 
who let the wrong people win the competition. The subjects to whom it appeals are told that 
they can and should be the very best kind of human capital, honed by natural and cultural 
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evolution. They are advised to prove this by waging a culture war which begins as a battle to 
free the self from the illusions of Liberalism and acquire the confidence and self-reliance 
needed to be truly autonomised and responsibilised. We might say that such a politics invokes 
class consciousness but that lacking a concept of class it adverts to consciousness of the self. 
Online, collective political identifications are formed not out of geographic coincidence or 
‘objective’ interests but as ‘affective publics’, agglomerations of selves, ‘mobilized and 
connected, identified and potentially disconnected through expressions of sentiment’ 
(Papacharissi, 2015). Thus, as Ging finds of men’s rights forums, the discourse is more cultural 
than political, marked by ‘preoccupation with men’s personal relationships and psychological 
and emotional pain rather than with collective political action’ (2019: 648). Online political 
celebrities interpret the world for their followers, showing them what has been hidden. They 
cultivate ‘charismatic authority’ offering not so much a programme for a political movement 
as the promise, in Weber’s words, ‘to effect a subjective or internal reorientation born out of 
suffering, conflicts, or enthusiasm’, (1978: 245) a personal rather than political salvation. 
Weber also observed that charismatic authority rejects ‘rational economic conduct’ (1978: 
244), generating income through ‘honorific gifts, dues and other voluntary contributions’ 
(1978: 1113) from which followers might obtain special access to the charismatic and a share 
in their esteem (1978: 1119). The structures of social media celebrity reproduce this kind of 
relationship. Subscription to a channel is a basic form of membership of a community. But here 
rational accumulation of wealth affirms rather than undermines the charismatic’s authority, 
proving competitive fitness. When Jordan Peterson jokes to podcast host Joe Rogan that he has 
found a way ‘to monetise SJW’s’ it is a joke but also evidence of his virtuous entrepreneurship, 
and of the rewards that will flow to those who come to share his truth by clicking like and 
subscribe. Here, form and content are as one. Online one can inhabit ideological conflict 
anywhere and all the time. Its very ubiquity is evidence of a political-economic ontology which 
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demands that one participate in that online conflict, intensify it and win it. Success as an 
ideological entrepreneur is its own reward and its own proof. 
 
Conclusion  
To make sense of politics online we cannot look only online. We have also to attend to the 
histories of ideas and ideologies on which people draw when making sense of politics for 
themselves. But we cannot only look offline. The economic and technological organisation of 
platforms changes who has a chance to communicate political ideas, the verbal and visual 
languages in which they can do so and the relationships these establish with and between 
audiences. Digital, participatory and shareable media hugely increase the number of people 
who can act as ideological entrepreneurs endlessly revising, reusing and recirculating political 
ideas and arguments, moving them in and out of all sorts of contexts. This has eroded the 
boundaries between and within ideologies (and, indeed, between ideologies and entertainment, 
fan-culture, self-help and other genres of public communication). Reviewing studies and 
examples of online ‘reactionary’ and ‘radical conservative’ politics we found an expanded and 
fluid ideological family, internally differentiated but united and organised around a concept of 
natural inequality and hostility to those who deny it, the ‘new class’ apprehended figuratively 
as the “SJW” and “Cultural Marxist”. Its politics is articulated in part as a critique of a kind of 
‘false-consciousness’ and it advocates ideological class conflict in the name of restoring natural 
order. 
The people exercising it may not share a unified identity or interests in any simple sense but 
‘new-class’ discursive power is a real power, exercised over the public sphere, taking shape as 
rules about communicative behaviour, setting boundaries to the narratives of the culture 
industries, establishing criteria for judging between knowledge and ignorance. It is also 
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powerful in workplaces where an increasingly important axis of conflict is between those with 
embedded practical skills and those in management and personnel working with abstract, 
discursive forms of knowledge (Kitschelt and Philipp, 2014). It is no surprise that this is 
contested. Digital participatory and shareable media make available new ways to challenge and 
to exercise interpersonal communicative and discursive power, training one’s verbal force on 
the verbalists, transgressing their rules and experiencing the power of the speech-act. What first 
manifested as ‘below-the-line’ polemics against the communicative authority of journalists has 
turned into brute contestation of discursive power and rejection of all kinds of technical and 
scientific authority (of virologists, climatologists and economists for example). That has given 
shape to – and been shaped by - the revival and renewal of a familiar ideological discourse of 
opposition to bureaucrats, academics and intellectuals now central to rejection of third-way 
neoliberalism and of governments which refuse intervention into economic production while 
increasing oversight of cultural consumption. 
Aspects of this backlash have been welcomed as a ‘return of the repressed’, an upsurge of 
popular hostility to the neoliberal consensus on globalisation and the suppression of working 
people’s rights (e.g. Streeck, 2017). However, online reactionary ideologies connect such 
hostility with a critique of ‘social justice’ derived from and fully congruent with Hayekian and 
related forms of neoliberalism (Phelan, 2019). It is, as Slobodian puts it, a critique of 
neoliberalism formed within rather than against it (2018, 2019). Furthermore, the bearers of 
this critique are participants in a marketplace, an attention economy which requires ‘content 
creators’ to adapt to the communicative affordances of platforms which incentivise the 
cultivation of parasocial relationships with and between ‘subscribers’ and ‘followers’. In that 
marketplace, charismatic ideological entrepreneurs compete to reveal the follies and the 
‘agenda’ of the ‘new class’, offering techniques for resisting its mystifications, ‘doing your 
own research’ and coming to self-consciousness. Latterly, QAnon has seized market share with 
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a yet more stark political dramatization, including the ‘revelation’ that the new class is literally 
demonic, predating on our children, with no limits to its depravity. Here resistance requires 
refusal to believe anything the journalists, scientists or politicians say; the SJWs, cultural 
Marxists and universalist intellectuals will do anything, rig any election and tell any lie, to stay 
in power. In January of 2021 fidelity to the truth demanded that people protest, take up arms 
and storm the cathedral on Capitol Hill but also that they film it, broadcast it live online and 
post about it on various messaging apps. In so doing, commenting, sharing/recirculating, re-
editing/reposting, they became content creators en route to successful ideological 
entrepreneurship. This is not a post-neoliberal politics but one which demands the yet greater 
marketisation of ideas and ideologies, culture and consciousness. It seeks an end to a monopoly 
of communication it thinks is held by the new class, as an act not of political ‘liberation’ but 
of ‘creative destruction’, clearing the space on which new monopolies may be built. It is, we 
might say, a critique of new class verbalism formed within that class and not against it. 
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